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The hidden Yes in you is stronger than all Nos and Maybes that afflict you and 
your age like a disease. – Friedrich Nietzsche1 
                                                          
 B.A. 2008, Brown University; J.D. Candidate 2012, Harvard Law School. The author would 
like to thank Professors Janet Halley and Peter Hutt for their insights and guidance, and his 
parents for their support and inspiration.   
 1 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 340 (Walter Kaufman trans., Vintage Books 
1974). 
124 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 25:123 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM NUREMBERG TO KANO 
A. The Birth of Informed Consent 
The principle of “informed consent” forms one of the “basic ethical protections 
for research involving human participants.”2 Informed consent requires that a human 
subject of scientific research “willingly verif[y] his/her willingness to participate in a 
particular treatment, after having been informed of all aspects which are pertinent to 
that treatment and relevant to the subject's participation.”3 Governments around the 
world have adopted a variety of regulations4 that articulate and enforce this “oldest 
and most universally accepted ethical standard in research.”5 In the United States, the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C) mandates that scientists who test 
new drugs first inform human subjects about the experimental nature of the studies 
and obtain their consent.6 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
federal agency charged with administering and enforcing the FD&C,7 has 
promulgated a series of regulations to implement this requirement.8 
The informed consent requirement originated in the Nuremberg Trials following 
World War II.9 Under the Third Reich in Germany, Nazi scientists conducted a 
variety of involuntary and often fatal medical experiments on concentration camp 
inmates,10 mainly Jews, Roma, and Slavs.11 After the war ended, the United States 
                                                          
 2 Maxwell J. Mehlman & Jessica W. Berg, Human Subjects Protections in Biomedical 
Enhancement Research, 36 J. L. MED & ETHICS 546, 552 (2008). 
 3 Jennifer J. Couture, The Changes in Informed Consent in Experimental Procedures: The 
Evolution of a Concept, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 125, 126 n.6 (2005). 
 4 See id. at 133-60. 
 5 SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS: TESTING NEW DRUGS ON THE WORLD‟S POOREST 
PATIENTS 147 (2006). 
 6 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (2008). 
 7 See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 4 (3d ed. 2007). 
 8 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20-50.27, 312.120(a) (2010). 
 9 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Couture, supra 
note 3, at 128-129. 
 10 See SHAH, supra note 5, at 69. A brief description can only begin to convey the horror 
of these studies:  
Eager to understand how the human body functioned at high altitudes, [Nazi 
scientists] encased subjects in decompression chambers, pumped all the air out, and 
then dissected the subjects while still alive to study their lungs. To see firsthand the 
effects of dehydration they starved subjects and forced them to drink only saltwater. 
They injected children with gasoline. They removed their subjects‟ bones and limbs . . 
. Inmates were injected with phenol to see how long it would take them to die.   
Id. 
 11 George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremberg, 
Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 121 (1992). By performing these “medical 
atrocities,” Nazi doctors sought to aid the German war effort, eliminate what they regarded as 
inferior races, and gain “scientific insight.” Couture, supra note 3, at 127-28. 
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prosecuted twenty Nazi scientists12 before the International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg, Germany for war crimes and crimes against humanity.13 Ultimately, 
seven of the Nazi scientists were sentenced to death and eight to varying prison 
terms.14 As part of its final judgment, the Tribunal promulgated a set of ten 
principles, later known as the “Nuremberg Code,” that provided the first 
international rules for scientific research on human subjects.15 The Nuremberg 
Code‟s first and most important principle16 directed: 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This 
means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give 
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of 
choice . . . and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of 
the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an 
understanding and enlightened decision.17 
Later international guidelines, such as the World Medical Association‟s 1964 
“Declaration of Helsinki,”18 provided further direction for medical researchers. 
Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Code “remains the most authoritative legal and ethical 
document governing international research standards.”19 Supreme Court Justice 
William Brennan once remarked, “[t]he medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply 
impressed upon the world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects is 
morally and legally unacceptable.”20 
B. Global Challenges to Informed Consent 
The globalization of the pharmaceutical industry, especially the clinical testing 
process for new drugs,21 has undermined enforcement of the informed consent 
requirement. When the FDA first began to regulate clinical studies in the 1960s, it 
hesitated to approve new drugs based on research conducted abroad, which caused 
pharmaceutical companies to rarely sponsor overseas trials.22 But as the FDA 
                                                          
 12 SHAH, supra note 5, at 69. 
 13 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177-78. 
 14 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 178. 
 15 See Couture, supra note 3, at 129. 
 16 See id.; SHAH, supra note 5, at 71. 
 17 The Nuremberg Code, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 3 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). 
 18 Declaration of Helsinki Recommendations Guiding Doctors in Clinical Research, THE 
NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
331-42 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). 
 19 Annas, supra note 11, at 121. 
 20 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 687 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 21 See Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical 
Research and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT‟L L.J. 245, 245 
(1997). 
 22 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 650 (3d ed. 2007). 
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gradually liberalized this policy, especially in its 1994 decision to allow new drug 
applications based entirely on foreign research data,23 the industry responded by 
moving its experiments offshore. The number of foreign investigators seeking FDA 
approval for new drugs increased sixteen-fold over the 1990s, while U.S.-based 
researchers declined.24 In 1999, over a quarter of new drugs approved by the FDA 
were first tested abroad,25 and by 2008 that figure had jumped to more than three 
quarters of new drugs.26   
Pharmaceutical companies based in First World countries have sought to conduct 
their research in the Third World,27 drawn by lower costs and a more permissive 
regulatory environment.28 The most popular new locations for foreign studies are 
developing regions such as the former Soviet Union, Latin America, India, China, 
South East Asia, and Africa.29 Between 1995 and 2005, U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies conducted nearly one-third of their clinical studies in poor and low-
income countries, and by 2005, approximately 40% of all international clinical trials 
occurred in these developing regions.30 One journalist explained, “rich countries 
                                                          
 23 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)(1) (1994). 
 24 SHAH, supra note 5, at 7. 
 25 Mary Pat Flaherty et al., Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR200810010111 
7.html; see also Yevgenia Shtilman, Pharmaceutical Drug Testing in the Former Soviet 
Union, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 425, 434 (2009).  
 26 Gardiner Harris, Concern Over Foreign Trials for Drugs Sold in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 
21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/health/research/22trial.html. 
 27 This Article uses the terms “Third World,” “developing world,” and variations thereof, 
interchangeably. They refer to poor and low-income regions, such as Africa, India, Southeast 
Asia, as well as parts of China, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union, where an 
increasing amount of human subject research takes place. 
 28 See Mary Pat Flaherty et al., Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR200810010111 
7.html; see also William Dubois, New Drug Research, The Extraterritorial Application of 
FDA Regulations, and the Need for International Cooperation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‟L L. 
161, 167-68 (2003). 
 29 See SHAH, supra note 5, at 7; Shtilman, supra note 25, at 434; Office of Inspector 
General, Dep‟t of Health and Human Servs., The Globalization of Clinical Trials: A Growing 
Challenge in Protecting Human Subjects 8-11 (Sept. 2001), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-00-00190.pdf. For instance, a survey of the clinical trials 
reported in leading medical journals in 1995 and 2005 found that the number of studies 
conducted in Africa, Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East had approximately doubled, 
while trials in the United States decreased by more than 10% and in Western Europe by nearly 
5%. See Seth W. Glickman et al., Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of 
Clinical Research, 8 NEW ENG. J. MED. 816, 818 (2009). 
 30 See Volnei Garrafa et al., Between the Needy and the Greedy: The Quest for a Just and 
Fair Ethics of Clinical Research, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 500, 500-01 (2010).  
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have the drugs and hypotheses, while poor countries have vast numbers of 
patients.”31 
Yet the “outsourcing” of medical research to the Third World has made it more 
difficult to regulate the ethics of human subject research. There are no binding 
international treaties that regulate human experimentation,32 and the international 
ethical guidelines, such as the Nuremberg Code, lack any sanctions or enforcement 
mechanisms.33 Government regulators in the Third World are “generally ill-equipped 
to oversee, much less manage, the clinical trials being held within their borders.”34 
Moreover, these poorer countries have “strong incentives to encourage leniency in 
national and local oversight of the research”35 to attract drug companies and obtain 
the financial benefits of clinical studies.36 The “resulting „regulatory vacuum‟ makes 
it difficult to ensure the welfare of trial participants,”37 and effectively permits 
inadvertent, or even intentional, abuse of human subjects.38 A series of recent 
headline articles in the Washington Post revealed that, in several instances, 
pharmaceutical companies had conducted clinical trials in the Third World in which 
researchers forged consent forms, lied to subjects about the nature of the study, or 
failed to reveal the potential dangers of the experimental drugs.39 Unfortunately, 
cases like these may not constitute isolated aberrations—a 1996 study found that 
nearly half of the clinical trials conducted in Chile that year suffered from “ethical 
problems,” most commonly a failure to obtain the subjects‟ consent.40 In addition, 
international variations in acceptable experimental protocols allow for studies in the 
                                                          
 31 Mary Pat Flaherty & Doug Struck, Life by Luck of the Draw, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR200810010118 
8.html.   
 32 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 21, at 273. 
 33 See id. at 273-74. 
 34 See Shtilman, supra note 25, at 436. 
 35 See id. at 435. 
 36 See Robert Gatter, Conflicts of Interest in International Human Drug Research and the 
Insufficiency of International Protections, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 351, 353 (2006). 
 37 See Shtilman, supra note 25, at 436. 
 38 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 21, at 270- 71. 
 39 See Karen De Young et al., Latin America Is Ripe for Trials, and Fraud, WASH. POST. 
(Dec. 21, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A31027-2000Dec20 
(explaining that researchers forged consent forms to test the drug cariporide on subjects 
without their consent, leading to the deaths of several participants); John Pomfret & Deborah 
Nelson, An Isolated Region’s Genetic Mother Lode, WASH. POST. (Dec. 20, 2000), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR2008100101158.html 
(indicating that researchers falsely promised free healthcare to impoverished Chinese villagers 
to draw their blood for genetic study, without explaining the purpose of the experiment); 
Sharon LaFraniere et al., The Dilemma: Submit or Suffer, WASH. POST. (Dec. 19, 2000), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR20081001011 50.html 
(reporting that researchers failed to inform study participants of the FDA‟s concerns about the 
drug Zeldox‟s effect on heart rhythms and its refusal to approve the drug pending more safety 
tests). 
 40 See LaFraniere et al., supra note 39. 
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Third World that would not satisfy First World regulatory scrutiny.41 Even in the 
absence of clear ethical violations, language barriers and cultural differences 
between First World scientists and Third World human subjects make it difficult for 
investigators to ensure that their patients legitimately consented to participating in 
research.42   
One high profile case of allegedly unethical pharmaceutical research occurred in 
Kano, Nigeria in 1996, when the American drug company Pfizer, Inc. sponsored a 
study of the experimental drug Trovan on hundreds of children during a meningitis 
outbreak in Northern Nigeria.43 After eleven children died and many more were 
injured,44 a group of Nigerian children and their guardians sued Pfizer in an 
American court, claiming that the company had tested the drug on them without 
disclosing the experimental nature or dangers of the research.45 The lawsuit 
ultimately led to the Second Circuit case of Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,46 in which the 
court declared that the prohibition on nonconsensual medical research constituted a 
universally accepted norm of international law,47 and held that violation of this 
norm—even when it occurred abroad—was sufficiently heinous to support the 
universal jurisdiction of an American court.48 The Second Circuit concluded “the 
norm prohibiting nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects has 
become firmly embedded and has secured universal acceptance in the community of 
nations.”49 The Abdullahi decision offered a source of both hope and despair—half a 
century after the Nuremberg Trial first announced the principle of informed consent, 
and the requirement became a widely accepted tenant of international law, violations 
continued to occur in the Third World.   
C. Proposal for a Critique of Informed Consent in Third World Research 
Concerns about the welfare of human subjects in developing countries have led 
activists, academics, and government officials in the United States to call for 
reinforcement of the informed consent requirement in Third World pharmaceutical 
research.50 This paper offers a critical analysis of that approach. Although the 
                                                          
 41 See Dubois, supra note 28, at 168. For instance, an American pharmaceutical company 
sponsored a study in Hungary of an anti-psychotic drug on mental patients confined to locked 
wards—an accepted local practice that United States regulators would not tolerate due to the 
possibility of coercing consent. See LaFraniere et al., supra note 39. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See Dubois, supra note 28, at 163-64. 
 44 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See id. at 183-84. 
 48 See id. at 177, 187. 
 49 Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added). 
 50 See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration, NIH Sees More Ethical Problems with 
Foreign IRBs; Steps Up Training, FDA WEEK (Mar. 17, 2006) (indicating that activist group 
Public Citizen condemns government decision to view foreign ethical standards as equivalent 
to U.S. requirements); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough to Use for Research, But Not Good 
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assurance of experimental subjects‟ voluntary participation in Third World clinical 
studies is certainly a laudable goal, a rights-based notion of autonomous consent 
ignores the actual context in which that consent takes place—a terrain defined by the 
absence of essential medical treatment, desperation for healthcare, and important 
cultural differences. These circumstances belie the notion of an inalienable and 
universal right to freely assent to medical experimentation. As an alternative, this 
paper proposes that advocates concerned about the interests of human subjects in 
developing countries address the distributive consequences of globalized 
pharmaceutical testing. This approach seeks to ensure that Third World citizens 
enjoy the benefits of the clinical trials conducted in their communities.   
This Article discusses the history of informed consent, critical analyzes this 
principle, and suggests an alternative approach to informed consent. Part II explores 
the concept of informed consent, including its philosophical bases, its 
implementation through FDA regulations, and current proposals on how to protect 
the principle in drug testing conducted abroad. Part III performs a critical analysis of 
the principle of informed consent; first providing an empirical examination of the 
realities of Third World human subject research, and then questioning both the 
coherence of an abstract “right” to informed consent, as well as the possibility of 
truly autonomous “consent” to such research. In Part IV, this Article suggests an 
alternative approach based on the principle of distributive justice, in which 
pharmaceutical companies ensure that the communities that bear the risks of clinical 
studies also enjoy the medical benefits of such research. Finally, Part V provides a 
brief conclusion and reflects on the implications of this critique.  
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF INFORMED CONSENT: THEORY, POLICY, AND ADVOCACY 
This section provides background on the principle of informed consent. Part A 
explores the theoretical bases of the informed consent requirement to reveal the 
philosophical assumptions on which it relies. Part B demonstrates that, in addition to 
the lack of international or local regulation of Third World clinical studies, the FDA 
applies a lower informed consent standard for foreign research. Finally, Part C 
recounts the proposals advocated by legal and medical scholars who seek to protect 
human subjects in the Third World by reinforcing the informed consent requirement.   
A. The Theoretical Bases of Informed Consent 
The principle of informed consent in human subject research is not a self-evident 
axiom of medical ethics, but instead relies on several philosophical assumptions. 
Grounded in “notions of liberal individualism, as expressed by eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Western philosophers,” the informed consent requirement draws 
predominantly on the moral principle of “personal autonomy.”51 Personal autonomy 
ideals hold that one‟s “personal self-governance” should be “free from control or 
                                                          
Enough to Benefit from the Results of that Research, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1127, 1150 (2004) 
(calling for the creation of a compulsory international standard of ethical protections for 
human subject research, to be drafted, implemented, and enforced through an international 
body); Office of Inspector General, supra note 29, at iii (recommending that the FDA 
encourage more rigorous monitoring of foreign research sites by sponsors to ensure human 
subject protections). 
 51 Elysa Gordon, Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: The Notion of Informed 
Waiver, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1321, 1326-27 (1996). 
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interference by others.”52 This principle thus relies on two more fundamental 
assumptions: that all human beings have an individual right to self-governance and 
that all human beings have the ability to freely choose their own destinies.53 The 
informed consent requirement similarly depends on these two theoretical bases. 
The informed consent requirement draws on the notion of inalienable and 
universal individual rights. First, it functions in the same way that legal philosopher 
Ronald Dworkin defined a “political right”—as a kind of “trump” over any 
otherwise “decisive,” collective, or utilitarian justification.54 It protects the 
individual‟s privilege to consent to participation in a clinical study and ensures that it 
is predominant over any competing government, scientific, or societal interest in the 
medical research.55 Thus, the Nuremberg Code mandates the principle of informed 
consent to “protect[] individual subjects first by protecting their rights.”56 Indeed, the 
Nuremberg Code refers to the voluntary participation of human subjects in scientific 
research as “absolutely essential.”57 Senator Jacob Javitz of New York, who 
sponsored the amendment that first mandated the informed consent requirement for 
research submitted to the FDA, similarly emphasized the importance of limiting the 
acceptable procedures of medical study to protect the individual right to informed 
consent:  
I am for experimentation. I feel deeply that some risks must be assumed 
in experimentation. But we must hold the balance between personal 
dignity and personal responsibility and the right of the individual to know 
how his life is being disposed of, at least with his consent, and the virtues 
of experimentation.58 
Second, the informed consent principle operates in the same way that Dworkin 
defined a universal right: an argument that may be asserted “against any collective 
justification in any circumstances reasonably likely to be found in political 
society.”59 Indeed, the Nuremberg judges based their declaration on “a natural law 
theory, deriv[ed] from universal moral, ethical, and legal concepts.”60 Moreover, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically articulates the 
informed consent requirement as one of the “inalienable rights of all members of the 
                                                          
 52 Id. at 1325. 
 53 See id. (“Autonomy acknowledges that all human beings have a capacity for moral 
dignity and that those who possess moral dignity are determiners of their own destinies.”). 
 54 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 364-65 (1978). 
 55 See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1344. 
 56 Annas, supra note 11, at 121. 
 57 The Nuremberg Code, supra note 17. 
 58 108 CONG. REC. 17,397 (1962) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 22 A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 
325 (1979). 
 59 DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 365. 
 60 Annas, supra note 11, at 121. 
2012] BEYOND NUREMBERG 131 
 
human family . . . derive[d] from the inherent dignity of the human person.”61 The 
covenant also declares: “no one shall be subjected without his free consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation.”62 The Second Circuit‟s holding in Abdullahi, 
that Pfizer‟s sponsorship of nonconsensual medical research in Nigeria constituted a 
violation of human rights sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of an American court,63 
further reflects this universal conception of the principle of informed consent. 
Informed consent draws on a theory of inalienable and universal individual rights 
that transcend both collective interests and cultural contexts. 
The principle of informed consent also assumes an individual‟s ability to exercise 
freedom of choice. Absent a belief in a person‟s ability to freely decide to volunteer 
for medical research, informed consent would amount to a meaningless protection. 
Thus, the informed consent requirement “reflect[s] a belief that an individual has a 
right to be free from nonconsensual interference with his or her person, and a basic 
moral principle that it is wrong to force another to act against his or her will.”64 For 
instance, the Nuremberg Code emphasizes that a human subject must be “so situated 
as to be able to exercise free power of choice” and that he or she must be provided 
sufficient information about the study so “as to enable him to make an understanding 
and enlightened decision.”65 Similarly, Senator Javits invoked the importance of 
personal decision-making in human subject research: 
If . . . we cannot tell a mature adult who is going to be used for 
experimentation with a drug which has not yet been reasonably 
demonstrated to be safe and who is well able to come to the decision that 
he wants it himself . . . where is the dignity, the responsibility, and the 
freedom of the individual?66 
In addition, the FDA has promulgated more stringent requirements for clinical 
studies that involve children who may be too young to legitimately choose to 
consent.67 Finally, courts have held that a physician is not liable for violating the 
informed consent requirement if she fails to provide subjects with information that 
would not have affected their decision to participate.68 In other words, informed 
consent calibrates the mandatory disclosure of information on the basis of its 
relevance to the subject‟s choice to join an experimental study. The notion that 
individuals are capable of making the autonomous decision to participate in 
scientific research, and that protection of this autonomy ensures an important 
freedom, provides the second philosophical basis for the informed consent 
                                                          
 61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 
23, 1976). 
 62 Id. at art. 7. 
 63 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177, 187.  
 64 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 75 (6th ed. 2008). 
 65 The Nuremberg Code, supra note 17. 
 66 Statement of Sen. Javits, supra note 58, at 325. 
 67 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.55 (2010). 
 68 See, e.g., Plumber v. Dep‟t of Health & Human Res., 634 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (La. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
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requirement.69 The principle of informed consent seeks to protect the ideal of 
“personal autonomy” celebrated by Western liberal philosophy. It ultimately rests on 
the theoretical foundations of individual rights and freedom of choice. 
B. The FDA’s Informed Consent Policies for Foreign Research 
As previously discussed, there are no binding international treaties governing 
human subject research, and Third World governments are often either unable or 
unwilling to effectively police the studies that occur within their borders. Instead, 
First World countries that house the pharmaceutical companies and consume the 
tested drugs provide the principal source of consistent regulatory authority for Third 
World medical research.70 The United States, home to the largest pharmaceutical 
market in the world,71 offers an important example. A pharmaceutical manufacturer 
that wishes to sell a drug in the United States must first submit a new drug 
application (NDA) to the FDA.72 According to the FD&C, the applicant must submit 
“substantial evidence” that the drug is safe and effective based on “adequate and 
well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations.”73 The FDA requires 
that all medical research performed to market a drug in the United States satisfy the 
principle of informed consent.74 Its regulations, however, prescribe differing 
standards and enforcement of this requirement depending on whether the clinical 
studies are conducted domestically or abroad.  
To regulate clinical studies that are conducted within the United States, the FDA 
has promulgated an extensive set of guidelines known as the “investigational new 
drug process” (IND).75 These regulations dictate, inter alia, the organization of the 
phases of clinical study, the experimental protocols used in the individual trials, the 
responsibilities of both the investigators and the sponsors involved in the research, 
and the format of the submitted data.76 An “institutional review board” (IRB) must 
oversee and approve the research for compliance with FDA regulations.77 The IND 
process specifically requires that investigators obtain the informed consent of every 
human subject who participates in their study,78 and even prescribes the form and 
conditions in which investigators may obtain that consent. First, investigators may 
only seek an individual‟s consent “under circumstances that provide the prospective 
subject . . . sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that 
                                                          
 69 RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 7-8 (1986). 
 70 See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 21, at 270. 
 71 See id. at 245. 
 72 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2008). 
 73 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2008). 
 74 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.60, 312.120(a)(1) (2010). 
 75 See 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2010); HUTT, supra note 7, at 624. 
 76 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20-70 (2010). The FDA‟s power to mandate these guidelines 
comes from its ability to exempt researchers from the usual prohibition on the shipment of 
unapproved drugs to conduct clinical studies. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2008). 
 77 21 C.F.R. § 312.66 (2010). 
 78 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.60 (2010). 
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minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.”79 Next, to inform the 
participants about the nature of the research, the investigators must give each 
potential subject, “in language understandable to [them],”80 eight basic elements of 
information regarding the study81 along with six additional elements when 
appropriate.82 Finally, the investigators must document each subject‟s written 
consent in a signed form and provide each subject with a copy of his or her form.83 
Children receive additional informed consent protections.84 The sponsors of clinical 
trials are responsible for monitoring the research and ensuring compliance with the 
IND regulations, including the informed consent requirements.85 The FD&C defines 
violation of these informed consent standards as a “[p]rohibited act,”86 against which 
the FDA may bring injunction proceedings87 or criminal prosecutions.88 
Clinical studies conducted outside of the United States may advance through one 
of two pathways for FDA acceptance. First, they may proceed through the IND 
process, which “bring[s] the investigator, regardless of the location of the research, 
under the federal regulations governing the conduct of research in the United 
States.”89 Second, investigators and sponsors may choose to conduct their foreign 
research independently.90 In this alternative pathway, the FDA does not directly 
regulate the research, but requires as a condition for acceptance that the study be 
“conducted in accordance with good clinical practice,” including “obtaining and 
documenting the freely given informed consent of the subject.”91 The phrase “good 
clinical practice” (GCP) comes from the human experimentation guidelines 
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promulgated by the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use in 1995, at which 
the United States, the European Union, and Japan attempted to harmonize their 
pharmaceutical development regulations.92 The FDA further requires that an 
“independent ethics committee,” similar to an IRB,93 oversee and approve foreign 
research conducted outside of an IND.94 Although the FDA will not accept a foreign 
study that fails to either fulfill the GCP requirements or document its subjects‟ 
informed consent, it will still “examine data from such a study.”95 
The FDA imposes a higher standard of informed consent, and provides greater 
enforcement of that requirement, for clinical trials performed domestically than for 
research conducted outside of the United States. First, the IND informed consent 
standards are more rigorous than the GCP requirements.96 The IND provisions 
dictate the circumstances under which investigators may seek subjects‟ consent, the 
language they should use, and the elements of information they must provide.97 Yet 
the GCP standard merely mandates that investigators inform subjects “of all aspects 
of the trial that are relevant to [their] decision to participate” and document their 
consent “by means of a written informed consent form.”98 These “extremely vague” 
requirements provide subjects with “significantly less assurance that actual informed 
consent will be obtained.”99   
Second, the FDA subjects research performed under an IND to more stringent 
enforcement of the informed consent requirements than foreign research conducted 
outside an IND. The FDA has the authority to directly enforce the IND informed 
consent standards through injunctions and criminal prosecutions.100 It has previously 
sent warning letters threatening to bring such proceedings when investigators and 
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sponsors under an IND failed to satisfy its informed consent requirements.101 In 
contrast, the GCP informed consent standards for foreign trials conducted outside of 
an IND are only a condition of acceptance for the research102—investigators and 
sponsors suffer no penalties for violations other than rejection of the flawed study. 
Indeed, although it will not officially accept the study, the FDA “will examine data” 
from foreign research conducted outside of an IND that violates the GCP informed 
consent requirements.103 Although the FDA requires adherence to the informed 
consent principle for all research submitted in support of an NDA, the fact that 
foreign researchers may choose whether to submit to the stricter IND rules or 
proceed according to the less rigorous GCP guidelines means that FDA regulations 
effectively provide less stringent application of the informed consent standard for 
medical research conducted outside of the United States. 
C. The Advocacy for Informed Consent in Third World Research 
In response to the lack of regulation of Third World research and the resulting 
ethical violations in places like Kano, commentators in both the legal and medical 
communities have sought to protect human subjects by advocating for the 
reinforcement of the informed consent principle. Their suggestions comprise a wide 
variety of approaches, including international collaboration, national legislation, and 
private action.104 The proposed reforms, however, can broadly be grouped into three 
main strategies that all seek to strengthen the informed consent standard in Third 
World clinical studies: improved standards, increased monitoring of medical 
research, and more rigorous enforcement of the requirement.105 
Commentators have advocated several ways to strengthen the substance of the 
informed consent standard as applied in the developing world. At the most basic 
level, scholars have called for the FDA to apply a more rigorous informed consent 
requirement to research abroad and to give human rights groups a voice in the 
formulation of this standard.106 Commentators have also proposed that international 
institutions or state governments articulate clearer and more binding informed 
consent requirements—for example, through a United Nations Covenant on Human 
Experimentation107 or the promulgation of ethics guidelines by the Third World 
nations that host medical research.108 Academics from the field of medicine have 
also suggested that the informed consent standard take account of cultural, social, 
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and linguistic differences between the First and Third Worlds by integrating local 
communities into the determination of the requirement‟s content.109 In addition, 
scholars have proposed reform of the process for obtaining informed consent, 
advocating the use of alternative media, more thorough documentation, and the 
involvement of communication experts to ensure that participants fully understand 
the nature of the research.110 Finally, legal commentators have proposed a theoretical 
reconceptualization of the standard, suggesting that property law may provide an 
alternative basis for the informed consent requirement that would better protect the 
bodily integrity of research subjects.111 All these reforms seek to reinforce the 
principle of informed consent by improving the content of the legal standard that 
implements it. 
Commentators have also argued for increased monitoring of clinical trials in the 
Third World. For example, the Office of Inspector General for the Department of 
Health and Human Services recommended that the FDA encourage pharmaceutical 
companies to perform more rigorous oversight of their foreign research sites‟ human 
subject protections.112 Scholars have also suggested that international health 
organizations and other non-governmental groups use new communication and 
media technologies to provide greater surveillance of clinical research in the 
developing world.113 Both legal and medical scholars have proposed strengthening 
the independence and capacity of the ethics committees and review boards in the 
Third World that provide local supervision for clinical research.114 At the most 
extreme, advocates have called for the international centralization of the ethical 
oversight for medical research through the mandatory registration of clinical trials 
with the World Health Organization.115 These proposals all seek to ensure adherence 
to the informed consent requirement by expanding oversight of drug testing in 
developing countries. 
Finally, scholars have proposed more rigorous enforcement of the informed 
consent standard in the Third World through a variety of legal mechanisms. One 
scholar has hypothesized that the FDA might bring criminal prosecutions against 
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pharmaceutical companies that sponsor unethical research.116 Alternatively, some 
proposals would establish an international tribunal for human experimentation that 
would enforce a code of ethics mandatory for all clinical studies.117 In a different 
vein, one commentator has suggested that the First World governments with the 
most lucrative pharmaceutical markets—the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan—should use the threat of market exclusion to deter drug companies from 
sponsoring unethical research.118 Finally, several scholars have argued that the Alien 
Tort Statute, which grants U.S. district courts subject matter jurisdiction over torts 
arising from violations of international law,119 could open U.S. domestic courts as a 
forum for private enforcement of the informed consent standard.120 In general, all 
these proposals seek to increase enforcement to deter future violations of the 
informed consent requirement. Commentators concerned about the ethics of medical 
research in the Third World have advocated for a variety of reforms that would 
reinforce the principle of informed consent, primarily through development of the 
substance of the legal standard, improvement in the level of oversight for clinical 
trials in the developing world, and expansion of the mechanisms available to enforce 
the requirement. 
III. A CRITIQUE OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THIRD WORLD HUMAN SUBJECT 
RESEARCH 
This section critically analyzes the principle of informed consent in Third World 
human subject research. Part A provides an empirical examination of the conditions 
in which Third World medical experiments occur, to demonstrate that the informed 
consent requirement operates in an environment defined by a lack of effective 
healthcare and profound cultural diversity. Part B then critiques the notion of an 
inalienable and universal “right” to informed consent, in light of human subjects‟ 
competing interest in accessing lifesaving medications and the uniquely Western 
values underlying the requirement. Part C critiques the notion that “informed 
consent” protects the free choice to submit to an experimental study, given that 
desperation for effective medical treatment drives so many subjects to participate. 
A. A Contextualization of Third World Research 
The emphasis on reinforcing the principle of informed consent often fails to take 
account of the actual context in which consent is given. The political, economic, and 
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social frameworks of many Third World countries play an important role in 
determining whether participants in medical experimentation actually enjoy the 
intended benefits of the informed consent requirement.121 An examination of the 
circumstances in which human subjects in developing countries consent to 
participate in clinical studies reveals an environment defined by a lack of access to 
healthcare, desperation for medical treatment, and cultural unfamiliarity with 
Western science and bioethics.122 
Reliable medical care is often unavailable in the Third World. In poor and low-
income countries, “public health institutions have serious difficulties in providing 
adequate health care, something that creates obstacles with regard to the recruitment, 
training, and support of specialised [sic] healthcare professionals.”123 While the 
world‟s annual per capita expenditure on health is $639, and in the United States the 
number climbs to over $6,000, in sub-Saharan Africa the same figure plummets to 
$11, and for several countries in the region it is less than $4.124 As a result, effective 
healthcare is available in developing countries “only for populations belonging to the 
highest social strata, and from which participation in clinical trials is rare.”125 
Approximately half of the Third World does not have access “to even the most basic 
drugs,”126 and 80% must instead rely on traditional healers.127 Journalist Sonia Shah 
describes the widespread poverty and sickness at the University Teaching Hospital in 
Lusaka, Zambia, where foreign researchers recruited children with AIDS and 
infectious diarrhea for a trial of the drug nitazoxanide: 
[T]housands of parents straggled into Lusaka‟s clinics and hospital, 
clutching tiny bundles: their shrunken, malnourished babies and toddlers 
whose innards, it seemed, were seeping out . . . Outside, the rutted roads 
overflowing with water had turned into orange swamps . . . The toddlers 
whose parents agreed to enroll them in the trial in Lusaka were extremely 
ill. They‟d been plagued with diarrhea for days. Most were severely 
underweight. Half were infected with HIV. The children were dying.128 
The lack of Western medicine is actually one of the reasons pharmaceutical 
companies increasingly conduct their clinical studies in the Third World—it 
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provides a vast pool of “treatment-naïve”129 human subjects who have not received 
other medicines. Thus, it allows researchers to more clearly identify the tested drug‟s 
effect.130 One recruiter of experimental subjects explained simply, “South Africa is a 
great country. . . . There are lots of individuals [with AIDS] who are not treated.”131   
The lack of access to healthcare in the Third World creates desperation for 
medical treatment that often drives the sick and impoverished to participate in 
experimental research. The website for one pharmaceutical company boasts, “The 
vast majority of people [in the Third World] have only the most basic healthcare . . . 
[allowing] clinical trials [to] provide study participants with access to more 
sophisticated medicine.”132 In fact, numerous surveys of the participants in Third 
World clinical research have consistently revealed that the primary reason they join 
the trials is to obtain healthcare.133 In a study of Ugandan parents who consented to 
allow their children to participate in a trial of malaria treatment, the authors 
concluded, “[m]any parents felt that they could not have refused to participate 
because their child was sick and they either did not know or did not believe that their 
child would receive treatment outside of the study.”134 One participant in a diabetes 
drug study in India explained, “[l]ook, I didn‟t have a stable job; insulin costs 1700 
rupees a month. I have two daughters. And I weighed 49 kg.”135 Moreover, clinical 
trials in the Third World often involve disadvantaged and “socially vulnerable” 
subjects136 who may be particularly desperate for treatment, such as drug addicts, sex 
workers, and pregnant mothers.137 While research administrators have “expressed 
concern that thorough informed consent would be overshadowed by patient 
desperation for therapy,” one human subject recruiter admitted to exploiting the 
situation: 
Say you need 1,000 patients in your trial. If you tried Western Europe, it 
would take you a long time to find untreated patients . . . [In a developing 
country], you might find those patients in half the time . . . [as] the 
healthcare systems aren‟t as sophisticated . . . [and] because of that, there 
is an increased interest in accessing drugs via clinical research, and 
therefore we can leverage that interest.138 
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The U.S. Embassy in Beijing recently went so far as to “warn[] U.S. medical 
researchers against working in impoverished, rural areas of China,” where “health 
care is poor and people are unable to protect their rights.”139 The lack of healthcare 
often serves as an important motivating factor for the subjects of clinical research in 
the Third World. 
Despite their desire for First World medical treatment, the subjects of human 
research in the developing world often come from cultures unfamiliar with the basic 
concepts of Western science and bioethics. For instance, in some African languages, 
there is no word for “research” or “science,” nor any concept of an “experiment” or a 
“placebo control.”140 “In traditional societies, the concepts of research, 
randomization, risks, side effects, and voluntary participation may be difficult for 
researchers to explain and potential participants to grasp.”141 More complicated 
scientific concepts are even more unfamiliar: “when language barriers exist and such 
concepts as germ theory or viral agents are alien, a description of an AIDS-related 
investigation . . . becomes difficult to relay to participants.”142   
European philosophical concepts may be similarly foreign to some Third World 
societies. Many Bantu languages lack a term corresponding to the English word 
“person,” instead conceiving of personhood in terms of one‟s tribe, village, or social 
group.143 Rather than define selfhood by the Western emphasis on the individual, in 
these cultures “it cannot be extricated from a dynamic system of social relationships, 
both of kinship and of community as defined by the village.”144 Political differences 
also render basic notions of Western bioethics strange to test subjects in the 
developing world. For instance: 
[In] nations governed for decades by dictators and despots, the Western 
concept of freedom of choice is weak or nonexistent . . . In countries 
wracked by recent wars or oppressed by secret police, test subjects are 
reluctant to sign their names to any document . . . Even in relatively 
peaceful, stable countries in Asia and Latin America, authoritarian 
cultural traditions can impede the process.145 
Studies have confirmed that Third World research subjects frequently do not 
understand the concept of informed consent, even when investigators follow the 
proper procedures for obtaining it.146 A survey of researchers working in the Third 
World who actually came from those regions revealed overwhelming concern with 
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the cultural appropriateness of U.S. ethical guidelines.147 When human subjects in 
the Third World give their informed consent to participate in clinical studies, they do 
so in an environment defined by a lack of access to effective healthcare, a 
desperation for medical treatment, and a culture unfamiliar with the principles of 
Western science and bioethics.148 
B. A Critique of the Right to Informed Consent in Third World Research 
These background conditions render the notion of a cognizable “right” to 
informed consent in Third World human subject research vulnerable to critical 
analysis. An allegedly inalienable and universal principle of informed consent cannot 
sustain itself in an environment defined by a lack of medical treatment and profound 
cultural diversity. First, given the absence of effective healthcare in much of the 
developing world, one must balance the informed consent standard against the right 
of human subjects to access lifesaving drugs through participation in clinical 
research—a contested question of policy, rather than an absolute ethical imperative. 
Second, the uniquely Western notions underlying the informed consent requirement 
render its enforcement in the Third World a kind of cultural imperialism, not a 
universal responsibility. 
Although, as previously discussed, advocates of the informed consent 
requirement present it as an inalienable right that trumps all competing 
considerations, in the Third World the principle conflicts with an equally compelling 
right of access to essential medicine. Critical legal theorist Duncan Kennedy 
explains that the promotion of a particular right nearly always confronts a 
“counterright that can be asserted in the same tone of voice and that cancels out the 
first right.”149 In fact, several legal commentators have advanced the notion of a 
human right to access medical treatment.150 One scholar declares: 
[T]he normative framework of human rights requires adequate progress to 
fulfill universal access to essential medications. At a minimum in this 
regard, international human rights law requires a clear plan to be made 
and deliberate steps to be taken toward the progressive realization of the 
right to health and does not permit policies or acts, even under pressure 
from other actors, which would entail regression in terms of availability 
or affordability of medications.151 
Absolute insistence on the protection of the informed consent principle would seem 
to conflict with this obligation. Given that current informed consent procedures 
already require an “enormous effort” from investigators, who sometimes need as 
                                                          
 147 See A.A. Hyder et al., Ethical Review of Health Research: A Perspective From 
Developing Country Researchers, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 68, 70 (2004). 
 148 See, e.g., Bhutta, supra note 110, at 774. 
 149 Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 212 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, eds., 2002). 
 150 See Noah Novogrodsky, The Duty of Treatment: Human Rights and the HIV/AIDS 
Pandemic, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 17 (2009). 
 151 Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right Under 
International Law, 21 B.U. INT‟L L.J. 325, 329 (2003) (emphasis added). 
142 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 25:123 
 
much as 45 minutes to counsel each human subject,152 many international health 
advocates have deliberately avoided demanding reinforcement of ethical research 
standards for fear of “imposing impossible demands and idealistic ethical standards 
on companies that can easily take their business elsewhere.”153 One bioethicist 
explained, “It takes half a second to look at how much more burdened the 
developing world is with ill health and disability. What we need, if anything, is more 
health research in the developing world, not less.”154 Indeed, a rights-based approach 
to Third World human subject research cannot easily reconcile the informed consent 
requirement with the demand for universal access to essential medical treatment. 
The counterright of access to essential medical treatment renders the informed 
consent principle an indeterminate policy preference subject to debate, rather than an 
indisputable and overriding “trump.” Kennedy writes:  
“[T]he inquiry into how to concretize the abstract right occurs in the 
presence of a countervailing right . . . This means that there are two 
opposing concretization projects going on.‟”155 One might believe 
passionately in both the abstract right to informed consent and the abstract 
right of access to essential medical treatment, but in the context of Third 
World human subject research, the practical implementation of one right 
inevitably leads to the derogation of the other. In such a situation, the 
informed consent principle loses its inalienable quality, its “absolute[] 
essential[ness]”,156 and instead “function[s] as no more than [an] 
interest.”157   
Resolution of the contest between the rights to informed consent and medical 
access will ultimately depend on one‟s personal ideology. Kennedy explains that 
“what determines the balance is not a chain of reasoning from a right or even from 
two rights, but a third procedure, one that in fact involves considering open-textured 
arguments from morality, social welfare, expectations, and institutional competence 
and administrability.”158 For instance, one could easily assert that any of the 
proposed informed consent reforms discussed previously would endanger the right 
of access to medical treatment in the Third World, and then make a convincing case 
against it on the basis of policy. African physicians, “desperate for a solution to the 
AIDS pandemic,” made precisely this argument when objecting to “burdensome 
informed consent procedures in the face of widespread death.”159 Thus, an insistence 
on the principle of informed consent does not free the regulation of Third World 
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medical research from the realm of politics, nor does it provide a clear way forward 
for the implementation of human subject protections. Instead, it entangles advocates 
in difficult and subjective questions of how best to balance subjects‟ conflicting 
interests in both personal autonomy and access to essential medicines. Such a debate 
requires resort to “non-rights arguments”160 that depend on the preferences of the 
observer. The suggestion that informed consent protections are self-evidently the 
desirable approach to Third World clinical research wanes when confronted with the 
competing claim of the participants‟ right to access medical treatment. 
Cultural differences between the First and Third Worlds further reveal that the 
informed consent standard is a uniquely Western concept, rather than a universal 
right appropriate for all societies. Post-colonial legal scholar Makau Mutua has 
argued that the notions of “human rights and Western liberal democracy are virtually 
tautological,” and that this “exclusivity and cultural specificity necessarily deny the 
concept [of human rights] universality.”161 He notes that “[t]here is virtual agreement 
that the early formulation and codification of human rights standards was dominated 
by Western cultural and political norms.”162 Indeed, the Nuremberg Code‟s pedigree 
is distinctly Western, as it was born from a criminal trial presided over by American 
judges, in which American lawyers prosecuted German scientists who committed 
crimes against European victims.163 The Declaration of Helsinki has been criticized 
along similar lines.164 In fact, the International Conference on Harmonization, which 
devised the GCP informed consent standards that the FDA applies to foreign 
research, did not include any developing countries.165 Thus, although it aspires to 
universality, the informed consent requirement actually relies on a conception of 
autonomous individuality that may not be applicable to more communitarian, or 
even authoritarian, Third World societies. For instance, two Pakistani researchers 
who studied informed consent procedures in Pakistan and Swaziland found that: 
[R]esearchers were often forced to penetrate layer after layer of tribal 
hierarchy and corrupted bureaucracy in order to obtain informed consent. 
Sometimes they had to ask the village elders or the husbands of women 
participants first, or employ police escorts, or have tea and snacks, 
“regardless of the time it took.” Plus, they had to struggle with the fact 
that some subjects don‟t have telephones, or permanent addresses, and 
may even be afraid to sign their names.166 
The researchers concluded that their findings “demonstrate[d] the inadequacy and 
complexity of applying western-based concepts of informed consent to developing 
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countries.”167 Far from a universal right, the informed consent requirement is a 
culturally contingent concept that is frequently alien to societies in the Third World. 
When commentators nevertheless advocate for a universal informed consent 
standard regardless of local cultural context, they essentially espouse a form of 
cultural imperialism. Mutua believes that “the unrelenting universalist push [for 
human rights] seeks to destroy difference by creating the rationale for various forms 
of intervention and penetration of other cultures with the intent of transforming them 
into the liberal model.”168 He condemns this practice as “cultural imperialism.”169 
Similarly, legal scholars have criticized enforcement of the informed consent 
doctrine in Third World medical research as a form of “ethical imperialism” which is 
not only ineffective, but may actually “undermine the nonindividualistic society‟s 
fabric.”170 In a culture where men consent on behalf of their wives and daughters,171 
or local leaders consent on behalf of community members,172 an insistence on 
applying the informed consent requirement may itself violate the principle of 
autonomy.173 Such a universalist approach would both “diminish[] an individual‟s 
right to decide how and by whom decisions of consequence to his or her life are 
made,”174 and disrespect the integrity of the community that participates in the 
research.175 African physicians have thus “bitterly opposed the informed consent 
standard, arguing that Westernized notions of informed consent merely impose a 
form of „medical-ethical imperialism‟ on developing nations.”176 Instead, they prefer 
to allow local health experts, bioethicists, and affected groups to assess the risks and 
benefits of medical research.177 Because the informed consent standard is culturally 
contingent, rather than universal, its reinforcement in Third World clinical trials 
would exacerbate a potentially destructive form of “ethical imperialism.” The 
informed consent requirement does not protect an inalienable and universal right; 
instead, it reflects a contestable policy judgment premised on a set of uniquely 
European cultural values and balanced against Third World citizens‟ interests in 
obtaining healthcare through participation in clinical studies. 
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C. A Critique of the Possibility of Informed Consent in Third World Research 
The fact that a lack of healthcare frequently drives human subjects in the Third 
World to submit to medical research belies the notion that the informed consent 
requirement meaningfully protects their free choice to participate. In practice, the 
doctrine of informed consent does nothing to correct the radical power disparity 
between researchers with the authority to dispense lifesaving pharmaceuticals and 
their sick and impoverished patients. Given that participation in clinical trials is often 
the only way for human subjects to obtain essential treatment, the informed consent 
requirement merely masks the potentially compelled nature of all medical 
experimentation in the Third World.   
The life or death interest that many Third World participants have in submitting 
to clinical research renders autonomy a meaningless concept. Feminist legal theorist 
Catharine MacKinnon discusses the criminal law of rape: 
The line between rape and intercourse commonly centers on some 
measure of the woman‟s “will.” But from what should the law know 
woman‟s will? . . . [W]omen are socialized to passive receptivity; may 
have or perceive no alternative to acquiescence; may prefer it to the 
escalated risk of injury and the humiliation of a lost fight; submit to 
survive.178 
Human subjects in the developing world, without other access to medical treatment, 
must similarly “consent to survive.” The constraints of this reality undermine any 
attempt to identify a legitimately “free” exercise of a subject‟s “will” to submit to 
experimentation.179 Thus, the “written informed consent form”180 by which the FDA 
separates permissible medical study from nonconsensual research cannot fairly 
represent the “voluntariness” of a subject‟s decision to join a clinical study. The 
choice between life and death is not much of a choice at all. George J. Annas, head 
of the health law department at Boston University‟s School of Public Health, 
remarked: 
I‟d argue you can‟t do studies ethically in a country where there is no 
basic health care . . . You can tell a person there that this is research, but 
they hear they have a chance to get care or else refuse their only good 
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chance at care. How can you put them in that position and then say they 
are giving informed consent?181 
In rape, Mackinnon suggests, “the issue is less whether there was force and more 
whether consent is a meaningful concept.”182 The same question could be asked of 
Third World human subject research. “The best evidence of voluntary, informed 
consent is when some subjects drop out or refuse to participate in a trial.”183 Yet in a 
survey of researchers working in developing countries, “45 percent reported that 
their low-literacy subjects never refused to participate.”184 One doctor who worked 
for Pfizer in Kano asked, “[g]iven [the study‟s subjects] poverty and lack of access 
to decent medical care, „Honestly, did they have a choice?‟”185   
In the absence of meaningful autonomy, the informed consent requirement 
instead serves to conceal the often-compelled nature of participation in Third World 
medical study. Research inherently entails more risks than standard medical 
treatment, since subjects may receive an inert placebo or a potentially dangerous new 
drug. Thus, “only those who „have absolutely no choice‟ can be expected to agree to 
the impersonal care doled out in a random trial . . . And these mostly poor patients 
who serve as subjects live in a world apart from the socially powerful doctors who 
experiment upon them.”186 In regard to rape law, Professor Dorothy Roberts argues: 
“the pervasive effect of male dominance makes it impossible to say definitively that 
some of women‟s sexual relations with men (called sex) are „free‟ and others (called 
rape) are „coerced.‟”187 Similarly, the desperate need for medicine in the Third World 
makes it impossible to discern where consensual experimentation ends and 
exploitation begins. The “inequality of knowledge, authority, and wealth between the 
researcher and the volunteer”188 renders the informed consent principle more an 
ethical protection for pharmaceutical companies than a material one for human 
subjects. By marking off and condemning one form of clinical study—
nonconsensual experimentation—the informed consent requirement justifies a much 
broader range of effectively compelled medical research on disempowered Third 
World patients.   
The current FDA regulations of informed consent reflect this power imbalance 
on a global scale. MacKinnon explains: “The law of rape divides the world of 
women into spheres of consent according to how much say we are legally presumed 
to have over sexual access to us . . . Little girls may not consent; wives must . . . 
[D]ividing and protecting the most vulnerable becomes a device for not protecting 
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everyone.”189 As previously discussed, the FDA similarly divides human subjects 
into “spheres of consent.” American children receive the most protection, followed 
by American adults, followed by the rest of the world. Accordingly, fewer and fewer 
Americans volunteer for medical research.190 Instead, the rest of the planet, 
especially the unregulated Third World, is presumed available for experimentation 
subject to baseline limitations.191 The signature on the informed consent form 
effectively conceals the reality that the investigators who control lifesaving medical 
treatment wield enormous power over their subjects, who must submit to 
experimental research in order to survive. 
The “informed” nature of the consent does not redeem it. In the law of rape, 
MacKinnon writes, “If the accused knows us, consent is inferred . . . Men believe 
that it is less awful to be raped by someone one is close to.”192 Yet “women feel as 
much, if not more, traumatized by being raped by someone we have known.”193 By 
analogy, the informed consent requirement recognizes as consensual a subject‟s 
participation in a study if she has “sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the 
elements of the subject matter involved.”194 Knowledge of the particular dangers of a 
study, however, does not necessarily indicate the voluntariness of a Third World 
subject‟s participation. Instead, the consent may well have been effectively 
compelled by personal circumstances and may sometimes just terrify the subject. For 
instance, one doctor recounted a study in Tanzania involving the administration of 
HIV tests on pregnant mothers, in which government health officials requested that 
the women not be told the purpose of the tests nor given the results.195 She explains, 
“The host country‟s decision was based on the judgment that the results could 
provoke hysteria within the population about a disease with no cure and for which 
limited resources were available, even for palliative treatment.”196 Because the 
subjects of Third World clinical research are often driven to submit by medical 
necessity, rather than considered reflection on the risks and benefits of participation, 
the fact that their consent is “informed” does not deprive it of its compelled 
character. 
Rather than define permissible medical research by the existence of a signed 
informed consent document, one might consider the perspectives of the participating 
human subjects. MacKinnon believes that: 
A feminist distinction between rape and intercourse . . . lies in the 
meaning of the act from women’s point of view . . . What is wrong with 
rape is that it is an act of the subordination of women to men. Seen this 
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way, the issue is not so much what rape “is” as the way its social 
conception is shaped to interpret particular encounters.197 
Similarly, medical research could be understood as nonconsensual if it feels that way 
to the subjects themselves. In fact, one survey of women who enrolled in an AIDS 
study in South Africa found that nearly 90 percent reported feeling “compelled to 
take part, even though they all had signed an informed consent form.”198 The same 
survey revealed that 99 percent of the women “believed [that] the hospital would not 
allow them to quit the study once it began.”199 Despite the implementation of the 
informed consent requirement, the perspectives of the actual human subjects 
involved in Third World medical research reveal that they frequently experience the 
clinical studies as compulsory.200 Because pharmaceutical trials often offer the only 
sources of essential healthcare in the Third World, and many human subjects choose 
to submit to experimentation for precisely this reason, the informed consent standard 
only serves to legitimize compelled medical research in the name of an illusory 
autonomy. 
IV. BEYOND INFORMED CONSENT: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN THIRD WORLD 
HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH 
Instead of a rights-based approach, advocates for human subjects‟ welfare might 
consider the distributive consequences of medical research in the Third World. 
Distributive justice in Third World medical research would address “the equitable 
distribution of the risks and benefits arising from [the use of] underprivileged test 
subjects in Western pharmaceutical research.”201 Although investigators conduct an 
increasing amount of clinical studies in developing countries, comparatively little of 
this research involves medicines to treat Third World maladies, or treatments that 
would be affordable to a Third World consumer. Reform of the clinical testing 
process based on the principle of distributive justice thus seeks to ensure that the 
communities that bear the risks of medical experimentation also enjoy the benefits of 
that research through access to affordable drugs for local illnesses. 
The outcomes of the global economy for new drug research skew heavily against 
the Third World. Developing countries disproportionately endure the dangers of 
medical research in comparison to the benefits that such research yields for them.202 
Out of over 1500 new drugs developed worldwide between 1975 and 2004, only ten 
were intended to treat diseases primarily prevalent in low-income countries.203 “This 
indicates that during the past 30 years, that is, the period in which the involvement of 
poor and low-income countries . . . has been the greatest, only slightly more than 1% 
of pharmacological innovations were directed at diseases that predominantly affect 
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the populations in these countries.”204 Scholars refer to this discrepancy as the “10/90 
gap”205—of the $56 billion annual global expenditure on medical research and 
development, 87% of the money targets the health needs of the world‟s richest 
16%.206 Thus, rather than focus on Third World health problems such as malaria or 
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, “[t]he diseases that are of most interest [in 
international clinical trials] are mainly the degenerative diseases—arthritis, obesity, 
heart disease—the diseases of people in the developed world.”207 
Even when Third World medical studies address diseases of local concern—such 
as HIV or parasites—they often produce treatments that are too expensive for the 
subjects‟ communities to afford. For example, one study conducted in Thailand led 
to the development of a treatment to prevent the transmission of HIV from infected 
mothers to their infants.208 Yet the drug ultimately cost $50—far beyond the reach of 
most Thai women, and thus, “useless for the community in which the test was 
performed.”209 Similarly, a trial in Zambia of the drug nitazoxinade, used to treat 
parasitic disease, yielded little long-run benefit for the community.210 The treatment 
was uniquely tailored to First World concerns and never licensed for use in 
Zambia—“if [the pharmaceutical company‟s] hunt for experimental bodies had 
ended in Zambia, their market clearly began elsewhere. The children of Zambia 
shouldered the burden for nitazoxanide‟s development, but they are hardly 
beneficiaries of the drug‟s advantages.”211 The fact that Third World nations often 
cannot afford the drugs tested in their communities becomes especially poignant 
when one considers that, after the desire to obtain medical treatment, the most 
frequently reported reason that human subjects in the developing world volunteer for 
clinical research is to “contribut[e] to finding better treatments for . . . people in the 
participant’s country.”212 Even in the absence of any rights-based injustices, the 
entire economy of globalized pharmaceutical research produces an inequitable 
distribution of risks and benefits, as Third World subjects disproportionately bear the 
burdens of medical research for the sake of First World consumers. 
A distributive justice approach to human subject research reform would seek to 
correct this imbalance by ensuring that the communities that undertake the risks of 
medical research also share in the benefits. The International Ethical Guidelines for 
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Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, promulgated in 2002 by the 
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences in collaboration with 
the World Health Organization,213 endorses such a policy. Guideline 10 states that 
sponsors and investigators who undertake research in a community with limited 
resources must make every effort to ensure that “the research is responsive to the 
health needs and the priorities of the . . . community” and that “any intervention or 
product developed, or knowledge generated, will be made reasonably available for 
the benefit of that . . . community.”214 Unfortunately, this language is fairly vague 
and the principle has not been followed in most cases.215 Nevertheless, scholars of 
bioethics have begun to suggest specific policies to ensure more equitable outcomes 
from Third World medical experimentation. These reforms include dissemination of 
the results of clinical studies to participating communities, maintenance of a 
favorable risk-benefit ratio for the regions where studies are conducted, post-trial 
provision of medical treatment to human subjects if the experimental treatment 
proves beneficial, and collaborative partnerships between First World investigators 
and Third World research institutions.216 These policies would begin to correct the 
distributive injustices of the globalized economy for medical research. In the long 
run, they could even increase access to essential healthcare in the Third World and 
reduce the role that desperation for medical treatment plays in many subjects‟ 
decision to submit to experimental study, potentially providing a route toward 
redeeming the informed consent requirement.  
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A “KANO CODE” 
The actual context of medical experimentation in the developing world 
undermines both the inalienability and universality of such a right and the possibility 
of true human subject autonomy. Advocates for the informed consent standard 
present it as an absolute ethical imperative that trumps all competing considerations 
and transcends cultural contexts. They claim that the requirement protects freedom 
of choice by ensuring that a subject‟s participation in experimental research is 
voluntary. The lack of healthcare in much of the Third World, however, implicates 
subjects‟ competing “right” to access essential medical treatment, which potentially 
conflicts with any straightforward reinforcement of the often-burdensome informed 
consent standard. Moreover, the cultural differences between some First and Third 
World countries suggest that the notion of informed consent may reflect uniquely 
Western values, rather than a universal principle. The fact that many subjects 
volunteer solely to obtain lifesaving medical care demonstrates that the informed 
consent standard does not meaningfully protect autonomy, but instead conceals the 
often compelled nature of participation in Third World clinical research. Thus, as an 
alternative to a rights-based approach to the new drug testing process, the benefits of 
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medical research to the Third World human subjects, who bear the cost, should be 
more equitably allocated to advance the principle of distributive justice.   
In light of this critique, the incident at Kano takes on a new significance. The 
Nigerian plaintiffs sued Pfizer for allegedly violating their right to informed consent. 
Yet, even if Pfizer had correctly followed the informed consent procedures, how 
many sick and untreated patients would actually have turned down the offer of free 
medicine? What material difference would informed consent have made in the lives 
of the Nigerian children who had few other alternatives but to accept Pfizer‟s 
experimental treatment? In fact, the informed consent standard loses much of its 
meaning long before most Third World medical trials ever even begin; especially 
since pharmaceutical companies commission studies to obtain FDA approval to 
market new drugs in the United States, and simply choose developing nations as 
testing sites because the countries have large numbers of untreated sick people on 
whom to test the drugs.217 Third World subjects endure the risks of experimentation 
for the benefit of consumers in the United States. This inequality embodies the true 
injustice of Third World medical research.   
One way the pharmaceutical industry might choose to correct this power 
imbalance would be through the formation of a “multi-stakeholder initiative” 
(MSI).218 An MSI is a form of “civil regulation”219 that facilitates dialogue between 
the various stakeholders engaged in a particular economic sector, such as 
corporations, non-governmental organizations, governments, academics, labor 
representatives, and affected communities. These parties then collaborate on 
developing and implementing a set of human rights standards for the relevant 
industry.220 Prominent MSIs include “The Fair Labor Association,” which addresses 
working conditions in factories worldwide,221 “The Kimberly Process,” which 
attempts to halt the flow of conflict diamonds from Africa,222 “Fairtrade 
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International,” which promotes trade justice,223 and the “Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative,” which attempts to improve transparency and accountability 
in the extractives sector.224 An MSI for international medical research would bring 
together private pharmaceutical companies, global health organizations, Third World 
research institutions, human subjects, and local communities to collaboratively 
develop a set of voluntary research standards for more equitably distributing the 
risks and benefits of medical experimentation. Companies that followed these 
standards would be certified as compliant and allowed to advertise their products as 
such.225 Because human subjects and their communities would play an active role in 
the process, the new research standards developed by an international drug testing 
MSI would begin to resolve the power disparity that often undermines the informed 
consent principle. First, the affected communities‟ own preferences would decide the 
policy balance between expanded access to medical treatment and increased 
regulatory oversight of clinical studies. Second, the new research guidelines would 
reflect the values of the society in which the research took place, rather than an 
imposed Western worldview. Finally, the human subjects would help craft their own 
ethical protections—allowing them the opportunity to select how the research itself 
would proceed, rather than the false choice of whether to accept lifesaving treatment 
at all.226 A medical research MSI would empower Third World communities to 
develop a “Kano Code,” a Nuremberg Code for the globalized pharmaceutical 
industry. 
Over half a century ago, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 
promulgated the informed consent requirement in response to the human rights 
atrocities that occurred during World War II. Today, an MSI-developed “Kano 
Code” must address the new distributive injustices that accompany the international 
market for clinical drug testing. A “Kano Code” would mandate that foreign clinical 
studies more equally allocate both their risks and their benefits, on the basis of 
specific directives derived from the interests of the affected communities and the 
distributive reforms discussed earlier. A Kano Code would ensure that, although the 
suffering children of Kano may not have had much choice as to whether to 
participate in Pfizer‟s study, the children and their communities would at least share 
in the knowledge and new treatments developed as a result of their participation. So 
far, advocates for the informed consent standard have distinguished ethical 
experimentation by the evidence of a “Yes,” nearly any “Yes” offered by a human 
subject. Yet, as Nietzsche wrote, many patients in the Third World have a “hidden 
Yes” inside them, fueled by a desperation for essential healthcare and stronger than 
all “Nos” or “Maybes” that the dangers of medical research might otherwise 
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warrant.227 In light of the increasing use of human subjects from the Third World, an 
equitable process for new drug testing demands a reach beyond the principle of 
informed consent, beyond “Yeses,” “Nos,” and “Maybes,” beyond Nuremberg, and 
toward a more just economy of international medical research. 
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